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FANTASY SPORTS AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ARE 





Gloria woke up at 6:00 Sunday morning to a loud alarm clock 
buzzing obnoxiously.  She turned over to wake up Steve, but he was 
nowhere to be found.  Steve could not sleep all night; he had so much 
on his mind that he forgot to turn off the alarm before he left for the 
big game.  Steve picked up Rick, and they made their way to the sta-
dium.  The Pioneers were on the cusp of earning a playoff spot for 
the first time in twelve years.  Today marked the last game of the sea-
son, and the Pioneers faced their rivals—the Renegades—in a must-
win scenario. 
The first half provided the home fans with much to be happy 
about, as the Pioneers were leading by four touchdowns at halftime.  
With such a sizeable lead for the home team, Rick looked as if he 
was on top of the world.  Steve, however, did not share Rick’s 
halftime high.  Steve’s favorite Pioneers player, whose name was on 
the back of Steve’s jersey, had already scored twice, yet Steve sat ex-
pressionless, studying something on his phone. 
As the second half progressed, Renegades’ quarterback T.J. 
Finley finally woke up after a dismal first half.  With the Pioneers 
leading by only four points and less than three minutes remaining, the 
Pioneers were forced to punt.  Rick noticed that Steve had finally 
started to take interest in the game.  As Finley was ripping apart the 
Pioneers’ defense at the seam, Steve rose to his feet.  With five se-
conds left in the game, the Renegades were left with one play.  Finley 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 2011 in Person-
al & Professional Communication, State University of New York at Geneseo.  I would like 
to thank my Mom for always stressing the importance of education.  I would also like to 
thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for making the publication of this Comment a possibility.  
Lastly, a special thank you to Alexa Gordon for her support and advice throughout. 
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launched the ball high and long into the end zone, where it was tipped 
and eventually caught by a Renegades’ receiver.  Steve immediately 
jumped in the air and screamed—in jubilation.  Steve’s favorite team 
had just lost, their season was over, and yet he was excited?  How 
could this be?  As it turns out, the Pioneers were not Steve’s favorite 
team after all—that honor went to Steve’s Savvy Surplus, which had 
just won the Fools Fantasy Football League and $800 as a result of 
Finley’s last second Hail Mary.1 
Steve is a quintessential example of how fantasy sports have 
monumentally impacted the sports world.  Long gone are the days 
when fans were only interested in their favorite teams.  Professional 
sports teams have noticed such a shift and, as a result, are making ad-
justments to their stadiums to address the rampant expansion of fan-
tasy sports.2  Fantasy sports’ substantial success is due, in large part, 
to the unique intimacy that fans feel with “their” players.3 
Fantasy sports leagues allow people to become virtual owners 
of professional athletes.4  Traditionally, leagues commence when the 
participants conduct drafts, which typically take place before profes-
sional leagues start their seasons.5  During the draft, fantasy league 
 
1 Hail Mary Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dict 
ionary/hail%20mary (last visited May 2, 2014) (defining a Hail Mary as “a long forward 
pass thrown into or close to the end zone as playing time runs out”). 
2 See Ken Belson, Going to the Game, to Watch Them All on TV, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/sports/football/jaguars-use-fantasy-football 
lounge-to-lure-fans.html? (describing how various professional football teams have built fan-
tasy lounges in their stadiums, enhanced wireless signals in their stadiums, and built fantasy 
features into their scoreboards in response to fans’ desire to follow fantasy sports even when 
they attend a live game). 
3 See Tom Rock, Giants’ Brandon Jacobs Received Death Threats via Twitter, NEWSDAY 
(Oct. 22, 2013, 2:49 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/football/giants/giants-brandon-
jacobs-received-death-threats-via-twitter-1.6301267 (discussing how a fantasy football par-
ticipant sent death threats to a professional football player and his family regarding the par-
ticipant’s ownership of the player in a fantasy league and the player’s performance in an up-
coming game). 
4 See David L. Pratt II, Fantasy Sports and the Right of Publicity: A Case for Viewing 
Dissemination of Player Statistics as Fair Use of the News, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 215, 
216 (2006) (addressing the impact that fantasy sports leagues have on an “everyday fan”). 
5 Compare Risa J. Weaver, Online Fantasy Sports Litigation and the Need for a Federal 
Right of Publicity Statute, 2 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (explaining how a traditional 
fantasy league operates), with Tony Manfred, People are Making $100,000 a Year Playing a 
More Intense Version of Fantasy Football, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Nov. 8, 2013, 12:37 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/people-making-100000-a-year-on-daily-fantasy-sports-
2013-11 (describing how a non-traditional daily league operates—“[y]ou choose your 
league, pay your entry fee, pick your team, and collect your winnings if your team gets better 
stats than the other teams in your league.  And then you do it all again the next day.”). 
2
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members pick real-life professional players.  Following the draft, par-
ticipants are left with a team composed of various players from dif-
ferent actual teams.6  Throughout the season, fantasy players have the 
ability to alter their team by adding, dropping, benching, and trading 
players—much like the duties of a professional team’s general man-
ager.7  Ultimately, professional players are the driving force of fanta-
sy sports because fantasy teams’ wins and losses depend upon the 
success of their players’ real-life achievements, which are represent-
ed by statistics.8 
Fantasy sports have changed since they were created by a 
group of New Yorkers in 1980.9  Today, over 33 million Americans 
participate in fantasy sports, fueling a $3.6 billion industry.10  The 
majority of that amount comes from league entry fees.11  Most fanta-
sy leagues compete for money from members who pay dues in the 
hope of winning the pool at the end of the season.12  Although league 
fees are typically collected and safeguarded by a player within the 
league, fantasy leagues can, alternatively, allow an online site to han-
dle their finances.13  The expansion of fantasy sports has created an 
influx of new Internet-based businesses that provide fantasy sports 
services, which comprise 273 businesses in total.14  Most of these 
sites provide players with advice on drafting and managing their 
 
6 Weaver, supra note 5, at 3. 
7 See Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, Fantasy Sports: One Form of Mainstream 
Wagering in the United States, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1195, 1209-10 (2007) (discussing 
the legality of fantasy sports and participants’ strategy when playing). 
8 Weaver, supra note 5, at 3. 
9 See Chris Colston, Revisiting Roto’s Roots, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 1999), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/bbw/2001-04-04/2001-04-04-archive-roto.htm (de-
scribing how fantasy sports originated when a group of friends created Rotisserie League 
Baseball). 
10 Industry Demographics, FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, http://www.fsta.org/?pa 
ge=Demographics  (last visited May 2, 2014). 
11 See id. (estimating that each fantasy player spends about $52 a year on league fees, 
which totals $1.71 billion a year). 
12 See Jeff Cade, The Real Money of Fantasy Sports, MONEY.MSN.COM (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://money.msn.com/personal-finance/the-real-money-of-fantasy-sports-jeff-cade (discuss-
ing fantasy sports’ significant economic impact). 
13 See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America 
Regulates Its New National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 22-23 (2012) (noting 
that fantasy host sites collect and distribute leagues’ funds as well as “third-party treasury 
sites,” which charge a fee for depositing the league fees “into an interest-generating, FDIC-
insured bank account” until the end of the season). 
14 Fantasy Sports Services in the US: Market Research Report, IBISWORLD INDUSTRY 
(June 2013), http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/fantasy-sports-services.html. 
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teams.15  The popularity of fantasy sports has led to the creation of 
unique businesses which offer services such as fantasy sports insur-
ance16 and fantasy sports dispute resolution.17 
The rapid growth of fantasy sports can be attributed to the rise 
of the Internet.18  The most notable type of Internet-based businesses 
which exist are host sites (which will be used interchangeably with 
“fantasy sites” throughout this Comment) that afford easy access to 
players to run and participate in leagues.19  These websites appeal to 
fantasy players because they deliver up-to-the-minute statistics, free-
ing participants from having to compile and calculate statistics on 
their own.20  Many websites offer to host leagues for free; however, a 
portion of sites still make a combined $290 million a year in website 
hosting fees.21  The majority of host sites’ revenue comes from the 
web traffic generated from hosting fantasy leagues.22  Consequently, 
the sites are able to attract advertisers, which provide sizeable reve-
nue for the sites.23 
This Comment examines the impact that recent case law, 
which decided that former college athletes’ right of publicity was vio-
lated when their likenesses were used in video games, could have on 
professional24 fantasy sports.25  In 2007, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
 
15 See Edelman, supra note 13, at 24 (discussing “strategic advisors, who make their liv-
ing by providing advice to other fantasy sports participants.”). 
16 See Nando Di Fino, A New Kind of Pocket Protection, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2009, 
10:19 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240529702035506045743606910 
19757738 (describing fantasy sports insurance—which allows fantasy sports participants to 
“protect themselves against the injuries of real players with actual insurance policies.”). 
17 See Elliot C. McLaughlin, Lawyers, Insurance Firms Cash in on Fantasy Football, 
CNN.COM (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/wayoflife/09/10/bizarre.fant 
asy.football.companies/ (discussing businesses that resolve disputes that occur in fantasy 
leagues). 
18 See Edelman, supra note 13, at 10-11 (describing how the Internet caused a substantial 
increase in fantasy sports participation). 
19 See id. at 19 (defining host sites as “websites that store league data and serve as the 
place where participants make changes to their roster”). 
20 See Pratt II, supra note 4, at 221 (describing how the Internet provided fantasy players 
“a quick and easy way to compile and disseminate league statistics.”). 
21 See supra note 10. 
22 See Cade, supra note 12 (stating that “sites tend not to discuss how they make their 
money, but industry analysts say ad revenue is based on a rate of anywhere from $2 to $10 
per 1,000 page views.”). 
23 Id. 
24 Please note that although fantasy leagues exist for college sports, this comment ad-
dresses only professional leagues.  Currently, college athletes must sign an agreement with 
the NCAA that restricts the players’ ability to use “his or her athletics skill (directly or indi-
4
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Appeals addressed professional baseball players’ right of publicity in 
fantasy sports and, ultimately, held that such right was outweighed by 
a fantasy site’s First Amendment rights.26  This Comment seeks to es-
tablish that the Eighth Circuit was incorrect in its ruling and that the 
courts should instead follow the reasoning provided by the video 
game cases to find that professional athletes’ right of publicity is un-
justifiably infringed by fantasy sites. 
Section II provides two hypotheticals—a former college foot-
ball player in a video game and a professional athlete in a fantasy 
sports setting.  This section allows readers to recognize the similari-
ties that exist between both contexts.  Section III addresses the histo-
ry of the right of publicity and discusses past cases that dealt with the 
use of athletes’ names, statistics, and likenesses.27  Section IV exam-
ines the faulty reasoning provided by the court in C.B.C. Distribution 
& Marketing v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.28—the 
precedential case regarding professional athletes’ right of publicity in 
fantasy sports games.  Next, Section V analyzes Hart v. Electronic 
Arts, Inc.29 and Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.30 (“Video Game Cas-
es”).  Lastly, Section VI highlights the effect that the Video Game 
Cases could have on the future of professional athletes’ rights of pub-
licity in fantasy sports games. 
II. WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?—A HYPOTHETICAL LOOK 
In a discussion of the legal aspects of the right of publicity, 
two fact patterns are instructive—one involves a former college foot-
ball player situated in a video game, and the other involves a profes-
sional football player placed in a fantasy sports setting.  Following 
 
rectly) for pay in any form in that sport.”  NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.1.2 (2013-2014), 
available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/usc/genrel/auto_pdf/2013-14/misc_non_eve 
nt/ncaa-manual.pdf.  College athletes’ rights in the NCAA are currently in a state of flux, 
another reason why this Comment only addresses professional fantasy sports. 
25 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Keller]. 
26 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 
818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter C.B.C. I]. 
27 Likeness Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio 
nary/likeness (last visited May 2, 2014) (defining likeness as “the quality or state of being 
alike or similar especially in appearance”). 
28 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
29 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
30 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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the hypotheticals, this Comment explores the similarities between 
both scenarios.  The similarities serve as a basis for the argument 
that, in both contexts, an athlete’s right of publicity supersedes video 
game manufacturers’ and fantasy sports providers’ First Amendment 
interests. 
A. Small Town Player with Big Time Rights 
John Saucey grew up in Wyoming, where there was little to 
do besides play sports.  Heading into his senior year of high school, 
he was set on one goal—playing college soccer.  After failing to re-
ceive interest from college programs, he sent film to colleges in order 
to get the ball moving, but he quickly learned recruiters were not go-
ing to call.  He understood that his desolate hometown prevented him 
from playing at the next level.  Turning to plan B, he attended the 
University of Wyoming to focus on academics. 
The first few weeks were tough for Saucey because Wyoming 
lacked a soccer program.  Faced with boredom, Saucey attended his 
school’s first football game where he became intrigued by the kicking 
part of the sport.  During the game, Wyoming’s punter sustained an 
injury.  The next day, Saucey ran to the stadium to find a football.  
After only a handful of kicks, he was destroying the ball and ready 
for a tryout.  After just one season, the former soccer player was re-
warded with a partial scholarship.  Following his senior year, he was 
named the conference’s best punter; however, Saucey received little 
interest from professional teams, thereby ending his football career. 
In an effort to relive his college days, Saucey purchased a col-
lege football video game, which included every Division I program 
and allowed users to make changes to rosters as well as individual 
players.  After scrolling through the nearly endless list of schools, he 
was thrilled when he finally found his alma mater.  During the game, 
it took him just two minutes to be faced with 4th-down-and-20-yards-
to-go.31  As he lined up for a punt, he noticed that Wyoming’s punt-
er’s jersey bore the number 2, the same number that Saucey sported 
during his playing days.  He hit pause and navigated to the roster sec-
 
31 See NFL Beginner’s Guide to Football, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/rulebook/begi 
nnersguidetofootball (last visited May 2, 2014) (explaining what a fourth down is: “[e]ach 
time the offense gets the ball, it has four downs, or chances, in which to gain 10 yards . . . 
[i]f the offense reaches fourth down, it usually punts the ball (kicks it away). This forces the 
other team to begin its drive further down the field.”). 
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tion of the main menu, where he could find more information for in-
dividual players.  When he reached the page for Wyoming’s punter, 
he was very surprised; the video game avatar32 not only shared his 
number, but also his height, weight, and home state.  The character 
also listed statistics that nearly mirrored Saucey’s.  Although the vid-
eo game character was nameless, Saucey was convinced it was an av-
atar of him. 
B. Hard Work Pays Off—Right? 
Tom Jones was the first Pop Warner football player33 in Flor-
ida to score ten touchdowns in a game, and this was only the begin-
ning of his football career.  Although he valued education, his real in-
terest was football.  For years, he visited the weight room during the 
day and studied films of legendary running backs in order to learn 
technique at night.  To go the extra mile, he traveled across the coun-
try to attend camps.  Jones finally reached his goal during his junior 
year of high school, when he received offers from major programs 
throughout the country. 
Jones attended the University of Alabama, where his motiva-
tion and hard work continued.  While other freshman teammates 
found time to occasionally attend parties, Jones studied his oppo-
nents’ defensive schemes in his dorm room.  No one expected him to 
start as a freshman because Alabama had an impressive running back 
returning for his senior year; however, the senior took a back seat to 
Jones.  Jones’s sophomore season was electrifying; he won the 
Heisman Trophy34 in a landslide and led Alabama to a national 
championship.  Believing that he had accomplished everything that 
he could at the college level, Jones entered the NFL draft and was se-
lected second overall. 
Jones returned to his hometown before the start of his first 
season, which gave him a chance to hang out with his friend Tim.  
 
32 Avatar Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/avatar (last visited May 2, 2014) (defining an avatar as “an electronic image that repre-
sents and is manipulated by a computer user”). 
33 See About Us, POPWARNER.COM, http://www.popwarner.com/About_Us.htm (last visit-
ed May 2, 2014) (describing Pop Warner as “a non-profit organization that provides youth 
football . . . for participants in 42 states and several countries around the world.”). 
34 See Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1237, 1243 (2005) (describing the Heisman Trophy as “a highly respected award for the best 
college football player each year.”). 
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Ironically, Tim had a fantasy football draft that day.  During the draft, 
as Tim was sifting through the players, Jones noticed his own name 
on the list.  There was an “R” next to his name to signify rookie and 
the numbers 955, 7, 2, 150, and 1 were displayed horizontally.  Tim 
informed him that they were projected stats for his upcoming season: 
955 rushing yards, 7 touchdowns, 2 fumbles, 150 receiving yards, 
and 1 receiving touchdown.  Jones also noticed the iconic Chevrolet 
symbol next to his name, which puzzled him. 
Towards the end of the draft, Jones was still available.  Feel-
ing obligated, Tim selected his friend.  As Tim made his pick, a 
popup window appeared on his computer screen stating, “You select-
ed Chevy’s Sleeper of the Draft—Click here to enter a sweepstakes 
for a new truck.”  At that point, Jones started to wonder, “Am I get-
ting paid for the use of my name like this?” 
Jones’s rookie season was not what he had grown accustomed 
to throughout his football career, as he served as his team’s backup.  
His best game came in week six, when he evaded the defense for a 
67-yard run but was tackled just shy of the goal line.35  However, 
Jones’s boost of confidence was short lived.  Following the game, he 
received numerous tweets36 about his performance.  Rather than re-
ceiving praise for notching the longest run of his career, he was ridi-
culed for failing to score on the play and received messages such as 
“Thanks for losing my fantasy week, you bum,” and “You may have 
won the Heisman, but you don’t belong in the NFL—Sincerely, Your 
spiteful owner.” 
C. Certainly Similar 
Saucey and Jones represent players whose football careers 
followed much different paths.  Saucey only started playing football 
in college, while Jones played his entire life.  While Saucey was a 
small-town high school soccer star, Jones was heralded as one of the 
nation’s top high school football players in a state known for foot-
ball.37  Saucey attended a college not known for football; Jones went 
 
35 Goal Line Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dicti 
onary/goal%20line (last visited May 2, 2014) (defining goal line as “a line that must be 
crossed to score . . . in football”). 
36 Tweet Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionar 
y/tweet (last visited May 2, 2014) (defining a tweet as “a post made on the Twitter online 
message service”). 
37 See Staff Report, Texas Tops the List of the Best High School Football States in the 
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to one of the best programs in the country.38  Saucey became an ac-
countant after college; Jones became an NFL player.   
However, the context of the misappropriation between both 
hypotheticals is similar because both players were performing the 
same activity for which they were famous for—playing football.  
Video games and fantasy sports are also similar.  First, both are con-
sidered games.  A game is defined as “[a] contest, for amusement or 
for a prize, whose outcome depends on the skill, strength, or luck of 
the players.”39  Video games and fantasy sports can certainly be con-
sidered a contest.  Next, video games are generally used for amuse-
ment; however, there are many video game competitions across the 
nation that offer prizes.40  Similarly, fantasy sports are used for 
amusement or prizes as well.41  The outcomes of both games are usu-
ally dependent on the skill of the players.  A gamer42 acquires skill 
from playing frequently and, likewise, fantasy sports participants are 
more likely to excel if they have played before and consistently spend 
time researching players. 
The features that Saucey and Jones believe violated their right 
of publicity are similar as well.  Both video games and fantasy sports 
involve statistics and player information.  Although Saucey’s name 
was not depicted, his biographical information implied that the video 
game character was, in fact, Saucey.  As a result, both games are us-
ing the players as a foundation.  While Saucey’s physical characteris-
tics afford the realism that video games attempt to deliver, Jones’s 
statistics make fantasy sports possible.  Both games have the same 
purpose as well—for the creators to earn money by providing enter-
 
County, MAXPREPS.COM (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.maxpreps.com/news/6trP5t2zy0WYPX1 
S2zE7EQ/texas-tops-the-list-of-the-best-high-school-football-states-in-the-country.htm 
(ranking the state of Florida third as the best high school football state in the country). 
38 See Chris Fallica, Nick Loucks & Harold Shelton, Counting Down College Football’s 
Most Prestigious Programs, ESPN.COM (Jan. 22, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news 
/story?id=3849028 (ranking the University of Alabama the sixth most prestigious college 
football program in the nation and the University of Wyoming fifty-first). 
39 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009). 
40 See Richard Nieva, Video Gaming on the Pro Tour, for Glory but Little Gold, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/technology/personaltech/video-
gaming-on-the-pro-tour-for-glory-but-little-gold.html?_r=0 (discussing video game competi-
tions and how the average salary for competitive gamers ranges from $12,000 to $30,000). 
41 Cade, supra note 12. 
42 Gamer Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictiona 
ry/gamer (last visited May 2, 2014) (defining a gamer as “a person who regularly plays com-
puter or video games”). 
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tainment to their users. 
Jones’s likeness may be infringed even more than Saucey’s.  
Right of publicity allows an “individual to reap the reward of his en-
deavors.”43  Jones dedicated fifteen years of his life to football and 
deserves to procure benefits derived from that hard work.  Saucey’s 
endeavors, on the other hand, are seemingly trivial.  Although he dis-
played dedication during high school, such commitment elevated his 
likeness as a soccer player, not as a football player.  As a result, 
Saucey’s four years of playing football cannot compare to Jones’s 
lengthy history on the gridiron. 
There are significant qualitative differences between the two 
athletes as well.  Jones spent his youth attempting to build his image 
as a football player.  He relentlessly developed his body and traveled 
across the country to make a name for himself.  Jones attended a 
premier college program in which he continued to build his name by 
winning a national championship and a Heisman Trophy.  However, 
the greatest difference is that Jones is a professional athlete.  
Throughout their lives, football players aspire to make it to the NFL.  
To some, playing football for a living is enough, but to others, the de-
sire to make money is what really fuels them.  That being said, a 
strong argument can be made that professional athletes should re-
ceive greater protection for their right of publicity whether their iden-
tities were used in video games or fantasy sports. 
III. THE HISTORY OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
A. A General Look 
The right of publicity is “the inherent right of every human 
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”44  In 1890, 
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren indirectly fostered the right of 
publicity when they wrote a law review article addressing the right of 
privacy.45  The authors believed that the law lacked an essential indi-
vidualistic protection—an individual’s “right ‘to be let alone.’ ”46  
 
43 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
44 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2013). 
45 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
46 Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE 
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888)). 
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The Right to Privacy has been heralded as “perhaps the most famous 
and certainly the most influential law review article ever written.”47  
The article’s influence was demonstrated when a group of states 
adopted privacy statutes or started to recognize a common law right 
of privacy following its publication.48  Eventually, celebrities sur-
faced with claims regarding the use of their persona in advertisements 
without their permission.49  Celebrities were not looking for privacy 
because they readily sought attention in order to enhance their image; 
rather, they needed protection from the commercial use of their im-
ages without their consent.50 
In 1953, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc.51 was the first case to address the celebrities’ concerns.  The Se-
cond Circuit held that a professional baseball player, in addition to 
his right of privacy, had a right of publicity for the value of his pho-
tographs used by a gum manufacturer.52  The court reasoned that 
“prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from hav-
ing their feelings bruised through exposure of their likenesses, would 
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing 
advertisements.”53 
Soon after, two law review articles expanded on the new legal 
right.  First, Melville Nimmer addressed the substance of, and limita-
tions on, the right of publicity in his article, noting that a person 
achieves publicity protection after expending a great deal of time, ef-
fort, skill, and even money.54  Nimmer suggested that “the use of a 
name may in itself carry considerable publicity value, and there 
would seem to be no reason to exclude such appropriation from the 
 
47 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203 (1954). 
48 Compare id. (finding that in 1954, eighteen states adhered to a common law right of 
privacy or enacted privacy statutes), with MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 6:3 (stating that in 
2010, “under either statute or common law, the right of publicity is recognized as the law of 
31 states.”). 
49 MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 1:7. 
50 See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 225, 229-31 (2005) (justifying the right of publicity on John Locke’s labor the-
ory); MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 1:7 (summarizing that celebrities’ “real complaint was 
damage to their ‘pocketbook,’ not their ‘psyche.’ ”); Nimmer, supra note 47, at 204 (privacy 
is the “one thing [celebrities] [do] ‘not want, or need.’ ”) (quoting Gautier v. Pro-Football, 
107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 1952) (Desmond, J., dissenting)). 
51 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
52 Id. at 868. 
53 Id. 
54 Nimmer, supra note 47, at 216 (explaining that “every person is entitled to the fruits of 
his labors unless there are important countervailing public policy considerations.”). 
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protection of the right of publicity.”55  In 1960, William Prosser de-
lineated the invasion of privacy into four distinct torts, which finally 
made it easier for courts to separate the right of publicity from the 
right of privacy.56  Prosser classified the right of publicity as the 
fourth type of invasion of privacy, referring to it as an 
“[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s 
name or likeness.”57  Prosser further defined appropriation as when a 
defendant “makes use of the name to pirate the plaintiff’s identity for 
some advantage of his own.”58 
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co.—the first and only time the Court has ad-
dressed the right of publicity.59  In Zacchini, the defendant, a reporter, 
recorded the plaintiff’s fifteen-second human cannonball act, despite 
the plaintiff’s opposition.60  Thereafter, the defendant aired the entire 
act on a television news program.61  Consequently, the plaintiff 
brought an action against the defendant, alleging that his publicity 
rights, under Ohio state law, had been violated.62  The Court rejected 
the defendant’s First Amendment defense63 because the First 
Amendment did not allow the station to air the plaintiff’s entire per-
 
55 Id. at 217-18. 
56 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
57 Id. at 389; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (ex-
panding on Prosser’s definition for the right of publicity—“[o]ne who appropriates the 
commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, like-
ness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade . . . .”). 
58 Prosser, supra note 56, at 403. 
59 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
60 Id. at 563-64. 
61 Id. 
62 See MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 6:3 (pointing out that although many states recog-
nize the right of publicity, no federal right of publicity exists). 
63 See Timothy J. Bucher, Game On: Sports-Related Games and the Contentious Interplay 
Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment, 14 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 
3 (2012) (addressing the First Amendment defense against right of publicity claims); 
Simply put, the right of publicity is a creature of . . . state courts.  Be-
cause a plaintiff could not otherwise bring a right of publicity claim 
without those state entities creating and enforcing this right, state action 
allows a defendant to assert constitutional protections as a defense.  In 
particular, because the right of publicity prohibits a person from using 
aspects of another's identity without consent, defendants will assert that 
the right of publicity violates the First Amendment by limiting expres-
sive acts.  This was the defense at issue when . . . the U.S. Supreme 
Court heard its first and only right of publicity case to date. 
Id. 
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formance without compensation.64 
Although Zacchini involved facts that are inapplicable to the 
issue addressed in this Comment,65 the Court did provide its rationale 
for the right of publicity, which is relevant here.66  Furthermore, 
Zacchini propelled the right of publicity onto the national stage, 
which conferred recognition and legitimacy on a legal right that was 
fairly unknown beforehand.67  As a result, the number of right of pub-
licity cases increased dramatically. 
B. What’s My Name Doing There? 
Right of publicity claims typically involve celebrities.68  As a 
result, athletes have historically appeared in court claiming a viola-
tion of such a right.69  Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc.70 in-
volved a group of famous professional golfers who claimed “an inva-
sion of their privacy and an unfair exploitation and 
commercialization of their names and reputations” in New Jersey 
state court.71  The golfers alleged that a board game used their names 
and biographical information, including statistics, without their con-
sent.72  They argued that the free use of their names in the product re-
duced their ability to garner future licensing agreements.73 
In response, the defendant argued that the golfers waived their 
 
64 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578. 
65 Zacchini dealt with a person’s entire performance as a basis for a right of publicity in-
fringement rather than a person’s name and likeness used in a commercial product. 
66 Id. at 576 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis 
Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966) (“The rationale for protecting the right 
of publicity is the straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good 
will.  No social purpose is served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the 
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay.”)). 
67 See MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 1:33 (“The right of publicity had its day in the glare 
of public attention on the stage of the highest court in the land and had defeated the weighty 
First Amendment of the Constitution.  After the Zacchini case, everyone took the right of 
publicity more seriously.  Twenty-four years after the Haelan decision, the right of publicity 
had at last achieved prominence and respectability.”). 
68 Id. at § 4:2. 
69 See Michael Gerton, Note: Kids’ Play: Examining the Impact of the CBC Distribution 
Decision on College Fantasy Sports, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 153, 159 (2009) (stat-
ing that “a significant portion of case law applying the doctrine involves claims by profes-
sional athletes . . . .”). 
70 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967). 
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right of publicity because they purposely invited publicity to advance 
their careers.74  Additionally, because the information was open to the 
public and regularly used by newspapers and magazines, the defend-
ant believed that it too should be given the ability to reproduce the in-
formation.75 
The court decided in favor of the golfers.76  When addressing 
the defendant’s first argument, the court reasoned that it would be un-
just for people to capitalize on another’s successes simply because 
they had been previously publicized.77  More importantly, when re-
jecting the defendant’s second argument, the court made a distinction 
between the defendant’s use of the golfers’ information in a board 
game and a newspaper’s use of the same information.78  The court 
acknowledged that publicizing celebrities’ biographical information 
did not “per se” constitute a violation; however, a violation occurred 
when the name and information is used in a “commercial project oth-
er than the dissemination of news.”79 
Three years after Palmer, another case which involved a 
board game was decided.80  In Uhlaender v. Henricksen,81 the Major 
League Baseball Players Association82 brought a misappropriation 
claim in the United States District Court of Minnesota regarding the 
unauthorized use of players’ names, statistics, and jersey numbers in 
a board game.83  The defendant contended that the names and statis-
tics were readily available in the public domain and that its use of the 
players’ information furthered the publicity that the players sought.84 
The court in Uhlaender followed Palmer’s rationale, and it 
found that the defendant violated the players’ rights based on the 
“unauthorized appropriation of their names and statistics for com-
mercial use.”85  The court dismissed the defendant’s argument that its 
 
74 Id. at 460. 
75 Palmer, 232 A.2d at 460. 
76 Id. at 462. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 461-62. 
79 Id. at 462. 
80 Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). 
81 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). 
82 See MLBPA Info – Frequently Asked Question, MLBPLAYER.COM, http://mlbplayers.mlb 
.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#mlbpa (last visited May 2, 2014) (describing The Major League Base-
ball Players Association as “the group licensing agent on behalf of the players.”). 
83 Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1278. 
84 Id. at 1279. 
85 Id. at 1283. 
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use was protected because the names and statistics are in the public 
domain and stated that the information is “valuable only because of 
past public disclosure, publicity and circulation.”86  The defendant’s 
second argument was also rejected by the court when the court de-
termined that the value in players’ names was attributed to the pub-
lic’s recognition of them and to hold that such publicity waived a 
player’s right “would negate any and all causes of action.”87 
In 1996, Cardtoons, a company which specialized in produc-
ing parody playing cards, sought a declaratory judgment in the Tenth 
Circuit that its cards did not infringe on Major League Baseball play-
ers’ right of publicity.88  The court found that Cardtoons violated the 
players’ publicity rights because the company used the players’ 
names and likenesses without their consent.89  However, the court ul-
timately concluded that Cardtoons’ infringement was fully protected 
by the First Amendment right to publish the cards.90  In justifying its 
ruling, the court noted that parodies provide a “valuable communica-
tive resource” to the public and that such commentary would be non-
existent, absent First Amendment considerations, because the players 
would never grant a license for products that “poked fun at the play-
ers.”91 
The court also articulated three economic and four noneco-
nomic justifications for the right of publicity.92  One economic justi-
fication, the additional inducement for achievement, was summarily 
dismissed by the court’s opining that celebrities “are already hand-
somely compensated.”93  Celebrities, according to the court, generate 




88 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962 (10th Cir. 
1996) (describing the parody cards as “caricatures of active major league baseball players on 
the front and humorous commentary about their careers on the back.”). 
89 See id. at 968 (stating the elements needed for a prima facie showing of publicity right 
infringement in Oklahoma: “(1) knowing use of player names or likenesses (2) on products, 
merchandise, or goods (3) without MLBPA’s prior consent.”). 
90 Id. at 976. 
91 Id. at 972. 
92 Id. at 973 (presenting the economic justifications as “further[ing] economic goals such 
as stimulating athletic and artistic achievement, promoting the efficient allocation of re-
sources, and protecting consumers[,]” and the noneconomic reasons as “safeguarding natural 
rights, securing the fruits of celebrity labors, preventing unjust enrichment, and averting 
emotional harm.”). 
93 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974. 
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ue of their identities is merely a by-product of their performance val-
ues.”94 
In 2001, a California appellate court paid closer attention to 
the information that was allegedly misappropriated.95  The case, 
Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball,96 involved former notable pro-
fessional baseball players claiming infringement of their right of pub-
licity by Major League Baseball.97  The players alleged that the de-
fendant violated their right of publicity by using the players’ names, 
statistics, and likenesses “in assorted All-Star game and World Series 
programs, or on its baseball Web sites.”98 
Although the court held that the players’ right of publicity 
was violated, it stated that “the right to be protected from unauthor-
ized publicity [must] ‘be balanced against the public interest in the 
dissemination of news and information consistent with the democrat-
ic processes under the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech 
and of the press.’ ”99  The court referred to the players’ information 
as “mere bits of baseball’s history” and “fragments from baseball’s 
mosaic.”100  The defendant, according to the court, was simply keep-
ing the public informed by using the players’ information because 
“[t]he records and statistics remain of interest . . . because they pro-
vide context that allows fans to better appreciate (or deprecate) to-
day’s performances.”101 
Ultimately, the court decided that the public’s interest in the 
free flow of information about baseball’s history superseded the 
players’ right of publicity.102  However, the court noted that the plain-
tiffs could have prevailed if they had presented a substantial compet-
ing interest, such as an impairment to their economic interests—
which they failed to do.103 
These cases show the multiple approaches that courts take 
 
94 Id. at 973. 
95 Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 314 (Ct. App. 2001) (stat-
ing that “a court must first consider the nature of the precise information conveyed and the 
context of the communication to determine the public interest in the expression.”). 
96 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307 (Ct. App. 2001). 
97 Id. at 309-10. 
98 Id. at 311. 
99 Id. at 313 (quoting Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d at 443 (Cal. 1953)). 
100 Id. at 314. 
101 Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 315. 
102 Id. at 318. 
103 Id. at 317-18. 
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when addressing right of publicity claims.  Palmer and Uhlaender 
distinguished the information being used from the dissemination of 
news and held that such information was not protected by First 
Amendment considerations.104  Gionfriddo involved similar facts, but 
the court concluded that the information was protected.105  Gionfriddo 
is distinguishable from Palmer and Uhlaender because the infor-
mation was used by a former employee to educate fans about the his-
tory of baseball,106 rather than usage by a board game company as 
seen in Palmer and Uhlaender.107  Lastly, Cardtoons dealt with an 
expressive work.108  The court valued the artist’s transformation of 
the athletes’ image and also found importance in the communication 
that the parodies provided.109 
IV. C.B.C.—FANTASY SPORTS’ PROVIDERS FAVORITE THREE 
LETTERS 
From 1995-2004, C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. 
(“CBC”) paid licensing fees to the Major League Baseball Players 
Association (“MLBPA”) in order to use the baseball players’ “names, 
nicknames, likenesses, signatures, pictures, playing records, and/or 
biographical data” in its fantasy sports products.110  In 2005, the 
MLBPA exclusively licensed such player information to Major 
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P. (“Advanced Media”), which 
ran its own fantasy games on MLB.com.111  Soon after receiving the 
exclusive rights, Advanced Media offered CBC a license to promote 
Advanced Media’s games on CBC’s site in exchange for revenue 
sharing, but not a license to continue running its own fantasy 
games.112  In response, CBC sought a declaratory judgment in the 
United States Eastern District of Missouri that its continued use of 
player information, without a license, did not violate the players’ 
 
104 Palmer, 232 A.2d at 461-62; Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1282-83. 
105 Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318. 
106 Id. at 315. 
107 Palmer, 232 A.2d at 459; Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1278. 
108 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969. 
109 Id. at 976. 
110 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. 
Supp. 2d 1077, 1080-81 (E.D. Mo. 2006) [hereinafter C.B.C. II]; C.B.C. I, 505 F.3d at 821. 
111 C.B.C. I, 505 F.3d at 821. 
112 Id. 
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right of publicity.113  Advanced Media, along with the MLBPA, in-
tervened in the matter, asserting that CBC’s use of players’ names 
and statistics in conjunction with the fantasy games violated the play-
ers’ right of publicity.114  CBC claimed that the players’ names and 
playing records were preempted by copyright law or, in the alterna-
tive, that the First Amendment outweighed any alleged right of pub-
licity infringement.115 
Magistrate Judge Mary Ann L. Medler ultimately found no 
right of publicity violation in CBC’s use of the players’ names and 
statistics and granted summary judgment in favor of CBC.116  In 
reaching its decision, the court focused on two particular elements for 
a right of publicity claim in Missouri—commercial advantage and 
identity—and considered both elements to be lacking for a prima fa-
cie case.117  Additionally, the court concluded that even if players’ 
rights were infringed, “players’ right of publicity must give way to 
CBC’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression.”118  The 
court used language from Gionfriddo, referring to the names and 
playing records as “bits of baseball history” because they are used to 
educate society about baseball.119  In its analysis, the court reasoned 
that the players’ names and statistics in fantasy games “[do] not go to 
the heart of the players’ ability to earn a living” because the players 
“do not earn a living by the publication of their playing records.”120   
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the names and statistics were 
readily available in the public domain.121 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit determined that the players’ 
right of publicity had, in fact, been violated, but it affirmed the lower 
 
113 C.B.C. II, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 n.5.  The case was heard in federal court because, in 
addition to a state right of publicity claim, CBC claimed that Advanced Media violated fed-
eral trademark law, pursuant to the Lanham Act.  Id.  However, the parties entered into a 
stipulation that only the right of publicity claim would be decided.  Id.  With the option to 
dismiss the case, the court decided to hear it because of “judicial economy, convenience, and 
fairness to the litigants[.]”  Id. 
114 Id. at 1082. 
115 C.B.C. II, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. 
116 Id. at 1107. 
117 Id. at 1089.  A right of publicity action in Missouri requires: “(1) [t]hat defendant used 
plaintiff’s name as a symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and with the intent to ob-
tain a commercial advantage.”  Id. at 1084-85.  Both parties conceded that the use of the in-
formation was without consent.  Id. at 1085. 
118 C.B.C. II, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1100. 
119 Id. at 1092-93 (quoting Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 314). 
120 Id. at 1091. 
121 Id. 
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court’s grant of summary judgment because CBC’s First Amendment 
considerations countervailed such intrusion.122  When addressing the 
right of publicity, the appellate court noted that “the district court did 
not understand” the identity element and failed to consider the Re-
statement’s view on the commercial advantage element.123  Because 
the court found enough evidence for a prima facie right of publicity 
claim, it continued to balance such violation against the First 
Amendment.124 
In accordance with the district court, the Eighth Circuit held 
that players’ names and statistics are already available in the public 
domain and went so far as to say that “it would be strange law” to bar 
a person from using information that is available to the public.125  The 
court also spoke about the public value of baseball players’ infor-
mation, as illustrated in Cardtoons and Gionfriddo.126  The court in-
cluded a lengthy portion of the opinion from Gionfriddo, which also 
dealt with statistics.127  However, the court failed to distinguish the 
obvious differences between the cases.  The plaintiffs in Gionfriddo 
were former players suing their former employer over the use of their 
likenesses in various mediums.128  Such facts are undeniably different 
from those in C.B.C.  The information in Gionfriddo was used to in-
form and provide the public with a look into baseball’s history be-
cause “the history of professional baseball is integral to the full un-
derstanding and enjoyment of the current game and its players.”129 
Unlike statistics for current players, statistics for former play-
ers are not as “readily available.”  Rather, Major League Baseball’s 
dissemination of the information may have been the only way for the 
public to learn about it.  The same cannot be said about the infor-
 
122 C.B.C. I, 505 F.3d at 824. 
123 Id. at 822-23. 
124 Id. at 823. 
125 Id. 
126 Id at 823-24.  The court referred to baseball as “the national pastime,” which the court 
quoted from Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972. 
127 C.B.C. I, 505 F.3d at 823-24 (stating that “ ‘[t]he records and statistics remain of inter-
est to the public because they provide context that allows fans to better appreciate (or depre-
cate) today’s performances . . . [and] the recitation and discussion of factual data concerning 
the athletic performance of [players on Major League Baseball’s website] command a sub-
stantial public interest, and, therefore, is a form of expression due substantial constitutional 
protection.’ ”) (quoting Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 315). 
128 Gionfriddo, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311, 314, (describing the information as “fragments 
from baseball’s mosaic”). 
129 Id. at 315. 
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mation used by CBC.  If the public wants to stay informed about pre-
sent-day baseball, then it may read a newspaper, watch a sports game, 
or visit websites such as MLB.com or ESPN.com.  Fantasy sports 
participants visit fantasy sites in order to do one thing—manage their 
team.  As a result, the statistics are being used as a commercial vehi-
cle, not a historical reference.  To compare the information provided 
by a fantasy provider to an actual news gathering source is simply 
wrong. 
Next, the court considered, but dismissed, the economic inter-
ests of the players.130  The court acknowledged that states typically 
provide protection in order for the “individual to reap the rewards of 
his or her endeavors” and to “provide incentives to encourage a per-
son’s productive activities.”131  However, the court seemed to think 
that because “major league baseball players are [already] rewarded,” 
then it is acceptable for another person to simultaneously cash in on 
the players’ hard work.132  The court also pointed out that players 
make “additional large sums from endorsements and sponsorship ar-
rangements.”133  Here, the court assessed whether athletes were 
wealthy enough.  The court, in essence, believed that the business 
owners profiting from the multimillion-dollar industry were not as fi-
nancially comfortable as athletes.  However, the court failed to men-
tion that the average Major League Baseball player’s career lasts only 
5.6 years.134  Also, upon retirement, many athletes become unem-
ployed, resulting in financial burdens.  After only two years of re-
tirement, 78% of former NFL players have filed for bankruptcy or are 
considered financial burdened, and within five years of retirement, 
“an estimated 60% of retired NBA players are broke.”135  Further-
more, athletes suffer numerous injuries during their careers, resulting 
in life-long aches and pains.136  Last, the court’s reasoning was circu-
 




134 Sam Roberts, Just How Long Does the Average Baseball Career Last?, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/sports/baseball/15careers.html?_r=0. 
135 Pablo S. Torre, How (and Why) Athletes Go Broke, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 23, 
2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1153364/1/index.htm. 
136 See Scott Clement, Do No Harm: Retired NFL Players Endure a Lifetime of Hurt, 
WASH. POST, (May 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/feature/wp/2013/05/16/do-
no-harm-retired-nfl-players-endure-a-lifetime-of-hurt/ (stating “[a] Washington Post survey 
of retired NFL players found that nearly nine in 10 report suffering from aches and pains on 
a daily basis . . . .”). 
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lar.  Since its inception, the right of publicity has been used to protect 
celebrities.  It seems illogical for a court to strip such a right for a 
wealthy individual when most celebrities are inherently wealthy. 
Despite the court’s questionable reasoning, the Supreme 
Court denied a writ of certiorari to review the case.137  In response to 
C.B.C., three of the most prominent fantasy host sites—CBS Sports, 
Yahoo!, and ESPN—contested their continued need for licensing 
agreements.  In 2009, CBS sought a declaratory judgment in the same 
district court in which C.B.C. originated.138  In CBS Interactive, Inc. 
v. NFL Players Association,139 the NFL Players Association, the de-
fendant representing the players’ rights, among other arguments, 
claimed that CBS’s use of the information was more comprehensive 
than CBC’s use because CBS included not only statistics, but also 
images, biographical information, and information pertaining to the 
players’ reputation and character.140  Still, the court did not see the 
difference between statistics and more intimate information.141  In the 
end, the court followed C.B.C.’s precedent and ruled in favor of 
CBS.142  Yahoo! sought the same relief in 2009.143  However, rather 
than continuing litigation, Yahoo! and the NFL Players Association 
settled the matter.144  ESPN renegotiated its terms with the MLB 
Players Association as a result of C.B.C. and CBS as well.145 
 
 
137 Major League Baseball Advanced Media v. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc., 553 U.S. 
1090 (2008). 
138 CBS Interactive, Inc. v. NFL Players Ass’n, 259 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 2009). 
139 259 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 2009). 
140 Id. at 418, 419.  The defendant also argued: (1) that CBS’s use of the player infor-
mation was a greater exploitation of publicity rights than the use in C.B.C.; (2) that consum-
ers could mistakenly believe that athletes are endorsing CBS’s website; and (3) public inter-
est in football statistics is much lower than baseball statistics.  Id.   This Comment will not 
address these three arguments because they are the least persuasive of the four. 
141 Id. at 417-18. 
142 Id. at 419. 
143 Steven Musil, Yahoo Sues NFL Players Group Over Fantasy Stats, CNET.COM (June 
3, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10256918-93.html. 
144 Gina Keating, Yahoo, NFL Settle Lawsuit Over Fantasy League, REUTERS (July 7, 
2009, 3:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/07/yahoo-sports-idUSN073331812 
0090707. 
145 John Ourand & Eric Fisher, ESPN Seeks Better MLBAM Terms, ST. & SMITH’S SPORTS 
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V. HART AND KELLER—TOUCHDOWN FOR RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY 
In two separate cases, former college football players proved 
that athletes’ right of publicity can trump First Amendment consider-
ations.146  Both cases originated soon after C.B.C. and CBS in differ-
ent jurisdictions, yet both circuits concluded that the athletes’ like-
nesses were unjustifiably infringed.147 
In 2009, Sam Keller, and other similarly situated former col-
lege players, filed a suit in the United States Northern District of Cal-
ifornia against video-game giant Electronic Arts, Inc. (“EA”), assert-
ing a violation of California statutory and common law rights of 
publicity.148  EA produced NCAA Football, a video game that was re-
leased each year and depicted “real-life” college athletes who were 
playing that particular season.149  The plaintiffs claimed that their 
right of publicity was violated because the virtual players wore the 
same number as the plaintiffs, looked like the plaintiffs, and shared 
similar biographical information.150  EA conceded that they infringed 
on the plaintiffs’ right of publicity; however, EA argued that such in-
fringement was protected by the First Amendment.151  The trial court 
disagreed.152 
The court first considered EA’s transformative use defense.153  
A work is transformative if the “product containing a celebrity’s like-
ness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s 
own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”154  The court 
compared Keller to a previous California video game case that was 
analyzed under the Transformative Use Test155—Kirby v. Sega of 
 
146 Hart I, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1284. 
147 Id. 
148 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 8, 2010).  The plaintiffs also sued the NCAA in this case for alleged violation of Indi-
ana’s right of publicity statute, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract.  Id.  This Comment 
only addresses the charges against Electronic Arts, not those against the NCAA, which fo-
cuses on amateurism issues. 
149 Id. at *1. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at *3. 
152 Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *3. 
153 Id. 
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America, Inc.156  In Kirby, the plaintiff was a musician who was 
known for saying “ooh la la.”  The court determined that the video 
game character was sufficiently transformed from the plaintiff be-
cause she was taller, dressed differently, and appeared in a different 
context.157  The court in Keller distinguished EA’s video game char-
acters from the character in Kirby.158  The virtual players in NCAA 
Football were almost identical to the plaintiffs in terms of physical 
appearance, and the video game also depicted the plaintiffs as what 
they were known to be—football players.159  EA also urged the court 
to consider the video game as a whole, rather than looking solely at 
the particular players.160  The court rejected this assertion, because 
past right of publicity claims in California routinely focused on the 
portion that included individual plaintiffs, rather than the entire 
work.161 
The public interest defense was also considered but rejected 
by the court.  Essentially, this defense is grounded in the idea that the 
public has a right to know and stay informed about important public 
interests, which are protected by the First Amendment.162  In this part 
of its decision, the court discussed Gionfriddo but distinguished it 
from Keller.163  The court held that EA was not informing the public 
about athletes’ statistics, but rather allowing the public “to assume 
the identity of various student athletes and compete in simulated col-
lege football matches.”164 
About a year and a half later, the United States District Court 
of New Jersey disagreed with Keller’s holding.165  In that case, for-
mer Rutgers University quarterback Ryan Hart sued EA, claiming a 
 
156 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006). 
157 Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *4. 




162 See, e.g., Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *5; Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640-41 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding a poster that depicted former newspaper 
pages reporting on a past super bowl, which included a picture of former NFL quarterback 
Joe Montana, was afforded the same First Amendment protection as the original newspaper 
because of the strong public interest contained in the information); but see Hilton v. Hall-
mark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 912 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a greeting card company’s public 
interest defense because the birthday card at issue did “not publish or report information.”). 
163 Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *5. 
164 Id. at *6. 
165 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 786-87 (D.N.J. 2011) [hereinafter Hart 
II]. 
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right of publicity violation under New Jersey law.166  EA did not con-
test Hart’s prima facie right of publicity claim, but again argued that 
the First Amendment trumps an infringement.167  Because “neither 
New Jersey nor the Third Circuit ha[d] explicitly adopted a test . . .  
reconcil[ing] First Amendment interests with the state right of public-
ity,” the court applied two tests—the Transformative Use Test and 
the Rogers Test.168 
The court’s application of the Transformative Use Test con-
trasted Keller’s application.169  Keller, according to the court, incor-
rectly focused on the challenged image rather than the complete 
product.170  When taken as a whole, EA transformed Hart’s likeness 
by providing users with a mechanism to alter many aspects of the 
game.171  Part of the alterations included the ability to change players’ 
physical characteristics, which was a major factor in the court’s deci-
sion.172  Although the game contained an actual photograph of Hart, 
the court held that the picture was a small part of an entire work, 
which is full of “transformative elements” in other portions of the 
game.173 
The Rogers Test, which is grounded in trademark law, 
amounts to a two-prong test which questions: “(a) whether the chal-
lenged work is wholly unrelated to the underlying work; or (b) 
whether the use of the plaintiff’s name is a disguised commercial ad-
vertisement.”174  The court determined that EA was entitled to First 
Amendment protection under the Rogers Test.175  According to the 
court, Hart’s likeness, although related to the game, was by no means 
an advertisement for the product but instead provided users with 
 
166 Id. at 763-64. 
167 Id. at 768. 
168 Id. at 775, 776.  Hart urged the court to use the Predominant Use Test, but the court 
found the test to be outdated and inapplicable in the video game context.  Id. at 776. 
169 Hart II, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 786-87. 
170 Id. at 787. 
171 Id. at 785. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 786. 
174 Hart II, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 793. 
175 Id. at 794; see also Brown v Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1248 (9th Cir. 2013) (re-
jecting a former NFL player’s claim against EA for a Lanham Act violation over the use of 
Brown’s likeness in EA’s Madden NFL games because, although Brown’s likeness was ar-
tistically relevant, no evidence supported “the claim that EA explicitly misled consumers as 
to Brown’s involvement with the games.”). 
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“public familiarity.”176 
After Hart filed for appeal, the Third Circuit overturned the 
district court’s decision.177  Initially, the Third Circuit contemplated 
which balancing test to utilize.178  The court considered the Trans-
formative Use Test, Rogers Test, and added a new test to the mix—
the Predominant Use Test.179 
The court ultimately adopted the Transformative Use Test be-
cause it found the test “uniformly applicable.”180  The court also se-
lected the test because it “effectively restricts right of publicity claims 
to a very narrow universe of expressive works” by first determining 
the extent to which the product “is the creator’s own expression.”181  
In its application, the court first considered Hart’s identity.182  The 
digital avatar representing Hart matched his hair color, hairstyle, skin 
tone and also listed similar biographical information.183  Next, the 
court looked at the context of the alleged appropriation.184  The con-
text, according to the court, strengthened Hart’s argument because 
the digital avatar was performing the same activity for which Hart 
was famous—playing football.185 
The circuit court then addressed the district court’s main rea-
son for finding a transformative element, the ability for a gamer to al-
 
176 Hart II, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 793. 
177 Hart I, 717 F.3d 141. 
178 Id. at 153. 
179 See id. at 153 (stating that under the predominant use test, a work does not have First 
Amendment protection “[i]f a product is being sold that predominately exploits the commer-
cial value of an individual’s identity, that product should be held to violate the right of pub-
licity and not be protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some ‘expressive’ con-
tent in it that might qualify as ‘speech’ in other circumstances.”  Id. at 154) (quoting Mark S. 
Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity—Free Speech 
Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003)).  The court rejected the Predominant 
Use Test because it considered it “subjective at best, arbitrary at worst[.]”  Hart I, 717 F.3d 
at 154.  Also, the Rogers Test was rejected by the court because the test considers the rela-
tionship between the image and the work as a whole, rather than looking at only the particu-
lar part of the work depicting the celebrity.  Id. at 154-55. 
180 See Hart I, 717 F.3d at 163 (describing the Transformative Use Test’s singular focus as 
“whether the work sufficiently transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness, thereby allow-
ing courts to account for the fact that misappropriation can occur in any market segment, in-
cluding those related to the celebrity.”). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 165. 
183 Id. at 166. 
184 Id. 
185 Hart I, 717 F.3d at 166. 
25
Miner: Fantasy Sports and Right of Publicity
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
814 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
ter the avatar.186  The court considered the “default players” to be the 
“sum and substance” of the game.187  In other words, people pur-
chased the game, according to the court, in order to use avatars de-
picting the real-life athletes, not to alter the players.  The court noted 
that regardless of such a feature, “the right of publicity can triumph 
even when an essential element for First Amendment protection is 
present.”188  Furthermore, the court downplayed the feature by allud-
ing to the slippery slope that could ensue if video game companies 
knew that adding such a feature would protect them from misappro-
priation claims.189 
The court also rejected EA’s argument that other creative el-
ements in the game transform the work as a whole.190  The court not-
ed that past decisions focus on “how the celebrity’s identity is used in 
or is altered by other aspects of a work.”191  Again, the court was 
concerned that “[a]cts of blatant misappropriation would count for 
nothing so long as the larger work, on balance, contained highly crea-
tive elements in great abundance.”192  As a result, the court ruled that 
EA did not sufficiently transform Hart’s identity and, therefore, re-
versed the district court’s decision.193 
In a stimulating dissent, Judge Ambro declared that the major-
ity had disregarded the work as a whole and punished EA for “finan-
cial success.”194  According to Judge Ambro, the other creative fea-
tures within the game could not be ignored.195  Even if the gamer 
used the default avatar, the other alterations that the gamer could 
make would have a direct impact upon the game and ultimately affect 
the default avatar.196  Accordingly, Judge Ambro recommended a 
Transformative Use Test that “prevent[s] commercial exploitation of 
an individual’s likeness where the work at issue lacks creative contri-
 
186 Id. at 166-68. 
187 Id. at 168. 
188 Id. at 167. 
189 Id. (“If the mere presence of the feature were enough, video game companies could 
commit the most blatant acts of misappropriation only to absolve themselves by including a 
feature that allows users to modify the digital likenesses.”). 
190 Hart I, 717 F.3d at 169. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 169. 
193 Id. at 170. 
194 Id. at 171 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
195 Hart I, 717 F.3d at 174-75 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
196 Id. at 175. 
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bution that transforms that likeness in a meaningful way.”197 
A few months after Hart was overturned, the Ninth Circuit 
heard the appeal in Keller and affirmed the district court’s deci-
sion.198  Applying the Transformative Use Test, the court compared 
Keller’s facts to No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc.,199 a Califor-
nia Supreme Court right of publicity case that dealt with a video 
game.200  In No Doubt, the plaintiff was a band depicted in the game 
Band Hero.  The court considered the context of Keller and No Doubt 
to be “similarly realistic” in that the gamers were acting as if they 
were football players and rock stars in virtual real-life venues.201  Fur-
ther, the avatars depicting the No Doubt band members were physical 
matches to the actual band members—much like Keller’s appearance 
was mimicked by his avatar.202  As such, the court held that Keller’s 
likeness was not sufficiently transformed—the same outcome 
reached in No Doubt.203 
Likely motivated by the dissent in Hart, EA once again ar-
gued that the Transformative Use Test should be applied to the game 
as a whole and not simply Keller’s avatar.204  The court again turned 
to No Doubt for guidance.205  Unlike the avatars in NCAA Football, 
the band members in Band Hero could not be altered.206  However, 
similar to NCAA Football, Band Hero contained many other creative 
elements.207  In No Doubt, the court declared that the creative ele-
ments did “not transform the avatars into anything other than exact 
depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as ce-
lebrities.”208  The court also distinguished NCAA Football’s ability to 
alter the default avatars from other California right of publicity cases 
which dealt with default characters that were unique from the begin-
 
197 Id. at 175. 
198 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271 (“Under the ‘transformative use’ test . . . EA’s use does not 
qualify for First Amendment protection as a matter of law because it literally recreates Keller 
in the very setting in which he has achieved renown.  The other First Amendment defenses 
asserted by EA do not defeat Keller’s claims either.”). 
199 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Ct. App. 2011). 




204 See id. at 1276, 1278. 
205 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1278-79. 
206 Id. at 1277. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. (quoting No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 411). 
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ning.209  The court reinforced its reasoning by referring to the holding 
in Hart.210  Like in Hart, the dissent in Keller asserted that the ma-
jority was applying the Transformative Use Test incorrectly by not 
looking at the game as a whole.211 
The court also considered the Rogers Test and the Public In-
terest defense but ultimately dismissed them both.212  The court noted 
that the Rogers Test “was designed to protect consumers from the 
risk of consumer confusion.”213  As a result, because “Keller’s public-
ity claim [was] not founded on an allegation that consumers [were] 
being illegally misled,” the Rogers Test was simply inapplicable.214  
The court also reasoned that EA did not have a valid Public Interest 
defense because the game “[was] not publishing or reporting factual 
data” for “it [was] a game, not a reference source.”215 
VI. TURNOVER ON DOWNS?  HART & KELLER’S POTENTIAL 
IMPACT ON FANTASY SPORTS 
A court has not decided a right of publicity claim dealing with 
fantasy sports since 2009.216  If a court were to address such a claim 
now, it would likely be guided by the recent holdings from the Video 
Game Cases.217  Notably, the majority opinions in those cases fol-
lowed the same reasoning, despite being in different jurisdictions.  
The Video Game Cases show that the current trend is for courts to 
use the Transformative Use Test for right of publicity claims.  The 
court in C.B.C. ignored the Transformative Use Test because the 
court deemed that the information used in fantasy sports was already 
in the public domain and akin to a newspaper, therefore relying on a 
 
209 Id. 
210 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1278 (“The Third Circuit came to the same conclusion in Hart.”). 
211 Id. at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The salient question is whether the entire work is 
transformative, and whether the transformative elements predominate, rather than whether an 
individual persona or image has been altered.”). 
212 Id. at 1281-83 (majority opinion). 
213 Id. at 1280 (citing Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002). 
214 Id. at 1281. 
215 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1283. 
216 CBS, 259 F.R.D. 398. 
217 This Comment takes the position that a college athlete and a professional athlete are 
entitled to the same protection because both types of athletes have elevated their likenesses 
to a certain level that products, such as video games and fantasy sports, are inclined to in-
clude them within their products.  However, professional athletes are entitled to a greater 
protection because their likenesses are more pronounced and recognizable than college ath-
letes’ likenesses. 
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public interest justification.218  Once an athlete can persuade a court 
that such reasoning is faulty, the question then becomes whether the 
player information used by fantasy sports companies would survive 
the Transformative Use Test—which is addressed at the end of this 
section. 
Although the Eighth Circuit agreed that athletes’ right of pub-
licity was infringed by CBC, it nonetheless devalued such violation 
based upon erroneous and subjective reasoning.219  The court merely 
looked at the information being appropriated, not how that infor-
mation was used.220  Player names and statistics, the court stated, 
were readily available in the public domain and, therefore, complete-
ly protected by the First Amendment.221  The court equated a fantasy 
sports website to a news source.  However, the court failed to distin-
guish the stark differences between the two.222  Fantasy participants 
visit fantasy sites not to educate themselves about the game, as in 
Gionfriddo, but rather to use the information to participate in a 
game—as in Palmer, Uhlaender, Hart, and Keller.223  The court, 
therefore, neglected to investigate the nature of the defendant’s use of 
the players’ names and statistics, and labeled the information as 
newsworthy purely because it could also be found in newspapers.  
However, a baseball card also contains information that could be 
used to educate the public, yet baseball card companies pay licensing 
fees224 because collecting baseball cards, like playing fantasy sports, 
is a hobby.  A person buys a baseball card in order to add it to his or 
her collection, not to learn about how the player performed the previ-
ous season.  Certainly, baseball cards can educate someone about 
America’s “national pastime,” but this is far from their primary pur-
pose.  The same could be said about a video game—it is a hobby that 
allows users to become closer to the actual players and rarely used as 
 
218 C.B.C. I, 505 F.3d at 823. 
219 See id. at 823-24. 
220 Id. at 823. 
221 Id. 
222 See MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 7:27 (stating “people who want to know statistical 
information about baseball players and games would not pay for admission to play fantasy 
baseball, they would just buy a newspaper, watch a TV sports show or log onto a sports info 
site on the Internet.”). 
223 See id. (“In fantasy sports the participants are active, whereas in reading about sports 
statistics, the reader is passive.”). 
224 Richard Sandomir, Topps Gets Exclusive Deal With Baseball, Landing a Blow to Up-
per Deck, N.Y. TIMES (Aug 5, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/sports/baseball/0 
6cards.html?_r=0. 
29
Miner: Fantasy Sports and Right of Publicity
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
818 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
a source of reference.  This shows that a court cannot simply look at 
the information on its face; instead, a court must consider the context 
and actual purpose for the information. 
The court in C.B.C. also justified a right of publicity violation 
by determining that the players were already justly compensated.225  
The court, in essence, stripped a legal right from athletes solely based 
on their income.  However, the fact that the careers of professional 
athletes are often short-lived226 bolsters the argument that athletes 
should be entitled to all compensation that they have a legal right to.  
Additionally, the court failed to consider the amount of money that 
the owners of fantasy sports companies receive.227  As renowned 
right of publicity scholar, J. Thomas McCarthy, pointed out, “I can-
not see how judges can or should make a moral or legal judgment as 
to which of those two groups is more entitled to the economic value 
of the fame and accomplishments of professional baseball players.”228 
In the Video Game Cases, the college athletes’ right of pub-
licity was violated primarily due to the inclusion of avatars resem-
bling the players.  The physical appearance of an athlete is important 
to his or her image.  Players’ names and statistics are equally central 
to their identities.229  Players receive lucrative contracts based, in 
large part, upon the statistics they compile.  Fans are attracted to 
players who perform well—which is usually reflected by players’ sta-
tistics.  In fact, an argument could be made that the appropriation of 
athletes’ statistics is even more detrimental to the players than a 
physical depiction.  A fan is more likely to remember that Cal Rip-
ken, Jr. holds the record for consecutive games played than that he 
has blue eyes.230  Regardless, as Palmer and Uhlaender indicated, the 
 
225 C.B.C. I, 505 F.3d at 824. 
226 Roberts, supra note 134. 
227 Richard T. Karcher, The Use of Players’ Identities in Fantasy Sports Leagues: Devel-
oping Workable Standards for Right of Publicity Claims, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 557, 579 
(2007) (pointing out that fantasy companies are “getting for free the full commercial value of 
the players identities”). 
228 MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 7:27. 
229 See Robert T. Ferguson, Jr., Note, Extreme Makeover: Redefining Athletes’ Identities 
in a Fantasy World, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 287, 319-20 (2007) (stating “CBC profits 
directly from the quality of players uniquely identified as valuable fantasy goods by their 
characteristic performances in MLB games.”). 
230 See 2,632 Consecutive Games Played, REALCLEARSPORTS.COM (May 17, 2013), 
http://www.realclearsports.com/lists/unbreakable_streakts/cal_ripken_jr_2632_consecutive_
games.html?state=stop (quoting Ripken Jr., “The [consecutive games played] streak has be-
come my identity; it’s who I’ve become.”). 
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dissemination of an athlete’s name and statistics is enough to violate 
his right of publicity and “past public disclosure, publicity and circu-
lation” fail to relinquish an athlete’s protected right.231 
Once an athlete can prove to the court that the information be-
ing used is not for the purpose of educating the public and that ath-
letes’ compensation is an irrelevant factor for the court to consider, 
the decisions in the Video Game Cases become persuasive.  To de-
termine whether the infringements in the Video Game Cases counter-
vailed First Amendment considerations, the courts used the Trans-
formative Use Test.  The test “shield[s] celebrities from literal 
depictions or imitations for commercial gain by works which do not 
add significant new expression.”232  When the courts have applied the 
Transformative Use Test, they made a significant distinction.  In their 
interpretation of “works,” the courts only considered the portion that 
included the particular player’s likeness rather than focusing on the 
video game as a whole.233  This interpretation narrows the scope of 
the work and ensures that an individual’s likeness will be protected 
even if the remainder of the work is transformative in nature.  As a 
result, the players’ likenesses were not transformed because the phys-
ical appearance and biographical information of the avatars in the 
game closely resembled the real-life players.234 
Fantasy sites are another context which lack a transformative 
element for the information that is used.  The sites do not alter the 
names or statistics of the players in any manner.  The athletes simply 
perform, and the sites simply compute such statistics into their sys-
tem.  Therefore, without the statistics, the sites would lose the data 
that drive their product.  Under the Transformative Use Test, fantasy 
sites would have to alter the statistics or names of the athletes.  How-
ever, such transformation would ruin a central component of fantasy 
sports—the personal connection that fantasy participants experience 
with the real-life players on their virtual rosters.  Fantasy sports 
would become even more of a fantasy if the players used were not 
based on actual athletes.  If fantasy sites were forced to make such 
changes, they would likely discontinue their games—much like EA 
 
231 Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1282-83. 
232 Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 615; see also Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809 (stating that the test 
asks “whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original 
work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum 
and substance of the work in question.”). 
233 Hart I, 717 F.3d at 169; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1278-79. 
234 Hart I, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
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did with NCAA Football in the wake of the Video Game Cases.235  
However, EA’s situation differs because of the complexity that exists 
between the NCAA and college athletes’ right to compensation.  
Thus, fantasy sites have another option to pay licensing fees if a court 
were to overturn the precedent in C.B.C. 
The dissenting judges in the Video Game Cases also present-
ed another possible outcome for fantasy sports cases.  As the Third 
Circuit pointed out, “few courts have applied the Transformative Use 
Test, and consequently there is not a significant body of case law re-
lated to its application.”236  The indefiniteness of the Transformative 
Use Test was reflected in the Video Game Cases’ dissents.  Rather 
than looking at the particular player information being used, the dis-
senters argued that the entire context must be measured.237  If the ma-
jority interpreted the test to include the entire video game, the case 
would have likely been decided in EA’s favor because of the creativi-
ty which is embodied within a video game.  Fantasy sports have a de-
gree of creativity as well.  A game which enables people to act as if 
they are general managers of sports team is quite creative.  Also, each 
fantasy site offers different features in order to appeal to users.238  
Therefore, although the sites are copying the names and statistics of 
the players, the product as a whole is certainly transformative.  That 
being said, if the courts were to eventually follow the dissents’ views, 
then C.B.C. may stand based on a different reason than the weak pub-
lic interest considerations to which the court adhered. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The decisions reached in the Video Game Cases provide sup-
port to overturn C.B.C.’s precedent.  The Transformative Use Test, as 
used in the Video Game Cases, affords courts with a “singular focus” 
 
235 Steve Berkowitz, EA Drops Football in ’14, Settles Cases as NCAA Fights, USA 
TODAY (Sep. 26, 2013, 10:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/09/2 
6/ea-sports-ncaa-13-video-game-keller-obannon/2878307/. 
236 Hart I, 717 F.3d at 160. 
237 Hart I, 717 F.3d at 174-75 (Ambro, J., dissenting); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
238 See Jeff Dunn, Ranking the Best Sites for Fantasy Football Online, 
TECHNOLOGYGUIDE.COM (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.technologyguide.com/feature/code-of-
a-champion-ranking-the-best-sites-for-fantasy-football-online/ (describing how Yahoo! pro-
vides “a dedicated team of professional fantasy writers who pump out informative and enter-
taining articles every day” and ESPN has “a site that’s attractive and feature[s] enough for 
the hardcore user, but not overwhelming to the ordinary player.”). 
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as to whether an infringement exists.239  The test provides a reliable 
framework that the ad hoc balancing test used in C.B.C. lacked.  In 
C.B.C., the Eighth Circuit, in failing to account for the users’ purpose 
in utilizing the fantasy sites, incorrectly likened fantasy sites to 
newspapers 240  Further, the court inappropriately used the athletes’ 
salaries as a basis for its decision.241  Although athletes have a reputa-
tion for being overpaid,242 such a notion should not be considered by 
a court.  After all, the Supreme Court declared that the main principle 
behind the right of publicity is “the right of the individual to reap the 
reward of his endeavors”243 and did not include a limitation for such 
reward.  As such, players should be entitled to compensation for the 
use of their name and statistics in fantasy sports.  Based on the recent 




239 See Hart I, 717 F.3d at 163 (describing the “singular focus” as “whether the work suf-
ficiently transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness, thereby allowing courts to account 
for the fact that misappropriation can occur in any market segment, including those related to 
the celebrity.”). 
240 See C.B.C. I, 505 F.3d at 823. 
241 See id. at 824. 
242 See Tulsi Patel, Pro Athletes Are Way Overpaid, DAILY HERALD (Apr. 27, 2013, 5:00 
AM), https://www.dailyherald.com/article/20130427/discuss/704279991/ (stating “[o]ur 
president earns a yearly salary of $400,000, and he runs our country, while the athletes just 
provide amusement.”). 
243 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
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